In [8, 9] Boneh et al. presented the first fully collusionresistant traitor tracing and trace & revoke schemes. These schemes are based on composite order bilinear groups and their security depends on the hardness of the subgroup decision assumption. In this paper we present new, efficient trace & revoke schemes which are based on prime order bilinear groups, and whose security depend on the hardness of the Decisional Linear Assumption or the External DiffieHellman (XDH) assumption. This allows our schemes to be flexible and thus much more efficient than existing schemes in terms a variety of parameters including ciphertext size, encryption time, and decryption time. For example, if encryption time was the major parameter of concern, then for the same level of practical security as [8] our scheme encrypts 6 times faster. Decryption is 10 times faster. The ciphertext size in our scheme is 50% less when compared to [8] .
INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario in which a content distributor, like a cable/radio broadcaster, wants to broadcast content while making sure that only those users who have paid for the service have access to the content. In such a system, each user will need a decoder with a secret key in order to decrypt the content. A naïve solution to achieve this would be to use an encryption system such that the corresponding secret key is known to all legitimate users. The broadcasting authority can then encrypt the content and broadcast the ciphertext. All legitimate users with the secret key will be able to decrypt the content. But if a dishonest user sells his key, then an attacker could build pirate decoders which it could then distribute, allowing unauthorized users to decrypt all future broadcast content without ever having to communicate with the attacker again. A malicious user could also use his own key to build pirate decoders. The problem is that in this system, there is no way to identify rogue users. A traitor tracing or trace & revoke system is designed to solve this problem. The purpose of a trace & revoke system, introduced by Chor et al. [11] , is to help content distributors identify rogue users and revoke their secret keys. If revocation is not desired, one can have just traitor tracing schemes, which helps the distributor identify the keys used in a pirate decoder. The content distributor can then hold the corresponding rogue user responsible for the loss incurred.
It should be observed that a traitor tracing system is not designed to help to protect any particular content. The problem of traitor tracing is distinct from what is commonly referred to as "Digital Rights Management" (DRM). DRM systems have traditionally been concerned with protecting the widespread distribution of content that is already in the hands of the (perceived) attacker. Clearly, there are fundamental obstacles to achieving this goal, since the attacker can simply record what he sees and then retransmit this. In a trace & revoke system, an authority can use the tracing mechanisms to identify all of the key material (actively) used in a pirate box and then disable these keys from being used to access future broadcasts. The use of trace & revoke systems best fits application such as satellite radio or other active broadcast services where users are interested in having a device that can access the current broadcast, without having to be in constant communication with a dishonest party.
1 Given a pirate decoder, the challenge in a trace & revoke system is to identify at least one of the users whose key must have been used to construct the pirate decoder and then revoke that key from the system. As such, traitor tracing can be seen as providing a type of cryptographic method for digital forensics -once a decoding box is discovered in the wild, the associated cryptographic tracing algorithm allows one to (provably) associate a particular user's secret key with the box.
A naïve solution to the problem just described (in a system of N users) would be to have N instances of an off-the-shelf encryption system such that the i th secret key is known to the i th user. The broadcasting authority could encrypt the content under each public key and broadcast all the ciphertexts 2 . Each legitimate user will then be able to decrypt the part of ciphertext corresponding to its private key. Given a pirate decoder, it is also possible for this system to identify at least one of the rogue users whose key was used to build it. We could then revoke this key by simply not encrypting under it in future broadcasts. But this system is very inefficient. For this system, the ciphertext size is linear in the number of users. We provide an efficient implementation of this naïve solution using a fast Elgamal encryption scheme and compare it with the performance of our scheme in Section 7.2. Previous Work. To overcome this limitation of inefficiency, many results with different levels of security have been proposed. A weak security property that has been the subject of the greatest amount of previous work is the t-collusion-resistant traitor tracing. A t-collusion-resistant tracing [3, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 21, 24] system will work as long as the pirate uses fewer than t user keys in building the pirate box. Prior to [8] , all such schemes required a ciphertext size blow-up at least linear in this parameter t.
A system that allows for traitor tracing regardless of how many users' keys are captured by the attacker is called fully collusion-resistant. Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [8] presented the first fully collusion-resistant traitor tracing system with O( √ N ) size ciphertexts and public keys. A fully-collusionresistant traitor tracing system with constant size ciphertexts [7] has also been constructed, but at the cost of enormous private key sizes (quadratic in the number of users).
Another issue of concern in traitor tracing systems is the need for a tracing authority, e.g [7, 8] which use a secret tracing key to identify rogue users. [10, 15, 22, 23, 25] allow for a public tracing algorithm that does not require any secret inputs. Other systems such as the one in [4, 9] provide security only against a static adversary and achieve O(1) size ciphertext and private key, but need O(N ) size public key (which is used in the decryption algorithm).
When considering only broadcast encryption, [9] acheive adaptive security with O(1) size ciphertext and private key (O(N ) size public key) and also provide a system with O( √ N ) ciphertext and public key. [14] obtain adaptively secure broadcast encryption with O(1) cipher-text, O(N ) private and public key. The recent work of [26] obtains identical parameters and also provides identity based encryption.
Building on [8] , Boneh and Waters [9] presented a fully collusion resistant, publicly traceable trace & revoke scheme, representing the "state-of-the-art" prior to this work. However, [9] crucially makes use of composite order bilinear groups, which lead to significant losses in efficiency that make the scheme impractical in many settings. The goal of the present work is to build new techniques to achieve order-of-magnitude improvements in efficiency without sacrificing any security. Our Contribution. We present a new traitor tracing system that achieves the same strong security properties as [8] , but avoids the use of composite order bilinear groups. Instead, using new techniques, our scheme is based on prime order bilinear groups, and its security depends on the hardness of the widely believed decisional linear assumption. This allows for shorter group elements and much more efficient schemes (see Section 7). We also extend this to build publicly traceable trace & revoke schemes, improving similarly in efficiency over [9] .
Hardness assumptions in composite order bilinear groups are limited by known attacks on factoring their modulii. Because of sub-exponential attacks against factoring, for appropriate security, large composite order groups must be used. When compared with prime order bilinear groups, for the same level of practical security (see Section 7 for details), a simple exponentiation in composite order bilinear groups is about 25 times slower than one in prime order groups. Also, one pairing operation in these larger composite order groups is approximately 30 times costlier than a pairing in prime order groups. The main contribution of this research is to present traitor tracing schemes based on prime order bilinear groups making them practical.
We also implement our protocol using the PBC library [18] (see Section 7) . We compare the efficiency our traitor tracing scheme with an implementation of [8] . We obtain encryption times up to 6 times better than [8] and ciphertexts that are 50% smaller. Decryption is 10 times faster.
We note that the techniques we use are general and can be used to convert other cryptosystems based on composite order groups to ones based on prime order bilinear groups. In this respect, our work is similar to generic methods described in a very recent concurrent and independent work by Freeman [13] . However, our schemes are different from the work of [13] . His work focuses on generality and while our work is on optimizing and implementing efficient traitor tracing systems. He provides a traitor tracing scheme using asymmetric bilinear groups while we provide schemes based on both symmetric and asymmetric groups. Also, our asymmetric construction is more efficient than his construction, which does not have any known implementation.
PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS

Traitor Tracing
A traitor tracing system provides protection for a broadcast encrypter. It consists of four algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt and Trace. The Setup algorithm generates the secret keys for all the users in the system and the public parameters for the system. By using these public parameters and the algorithm Encrypt, any user can encrypt a message to all the users in the system. A recipient can use his secret key and the Decrypt algorithm to decrypt a ciphertext.
In case an authority discovers a pirate decoder, it can then use the T race algorithm to identify at least one of the users whose private key must have been used in the construction of the pirate decoder. A publicly traceable scheme is one where the T race algorithm has no secret inputs, i.e there are no tracing secret keys.
The desired security properties of a traitor tracing system are the following:
• Semantic Security: An adversary that does not have access to the secret key of any user should not be able to distinguish between encryptions of two messages of its choice.
• Traceability Against Arbitrary Collusion: Consider a case where an adversary has access to an arbitrary number of keys of its choice and generates a pirate decoder. Then the tracing algorithm should be able to use the pirate decoder and detect at least one of the users whose key must have been used to construct the pirate decoder.
Trace & Revoke
A Trace & Revoke system is a traitor tracing system that provides an additional property of user revocation. Once a set of rogue users are identified, the system allows for all honest parties to encrypt to the rest of the honest users securely. The system consists of four algorithms Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt and T race. The Setup algorithm generates the secret keys for all the users in the system and the public parameters for the system. The Encrypt algorithm can be used to encrypt a message to any subset of users of the system. Decrypt is used to decrypt a valid ciphertext. In a secure Trace & Revoke system, the Decrypt algorithm succeeds if and only if the encryption was intended for him (he belongs to the set of users that the message was encrypted to). The T race algorithm is used to identify the key used inside a pirate decoder.
Boneh et al. [8] introduce a new primitive, Private Linear Broadcast Encryption (PLBE) and showed that a PLBE is sufficient for implementing a fully collusion-resistant traitor tracing scheme. In this paper, we give an informal treatment (see [8] for details) of traitor tracing systems and their relation to PLBE and present an improved PLBE scheme.
Boneh and Waters [9] introduce a new primitive, Augmented Broadcast Encryption (AugBE) and use an AugBE scheme (based on composite order bilinear groups) to implement a fully collusion-resistant trace & revoke scheme, secure against adaptive adversaries. We present an improved AugBE scheme based only on prime order groups.
AugBE
An Augmented Broadcast Encryption (AugBE) [9] system consists of three algorithms: SetupAugBE, EncryptAugBE, DecryptAugBE.
• (P K, K1, K2 . . . KN ) $ ← − SetupAugBE(λ): SetupAugBE algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and sets up the public parameters P K for the system along with generating the secret keys (K1, K2 . . . KN ) for all the users in the system. N is the number of users in the system.
• C $ ← − EncryptAugBE(S, P K, i, M ): This algorithm takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , N } of users, the public key PK, and an index 1 ≤ i ≤ N +1, and a message M. The algorithms outputs a ciphertext which can be decrypted by any user belonging to the set S ∩{i, . . . , N }. the ciphertext.
• M ← DecryptAugBE(S, j, Kj, C, P K): A user j having access to the private key Kj can decrypt a ciphertext C and obtain the corresponding message M . If he is not able to decrypt he outputs ⊥.
PLBE system consists of similar algorithms. The only difference between the AugBE and PLBE systems is that PLBE algorithms do not take set S as input. The set of all users is implied each time set S is referred to. We refer the reader to [8] for details.
Desired Security Properties
We only describe the security properties required of an AugBE system. The security properties required of a PLBE system are implied by the ones for an AugBE system under the condition that the set S is the set of all users. An AugBE system is considered secure if no adversary has significant advantage in the following games:
• Index Hiding: This property prevents an adversary from distinguishing between EncryptAugBE(S, P K, i, M ) and EncryptAugBE(S, i + 1, P K, M ) when the adversary knows all the secret keys except the i th secret key. Also when i / ∈ S, an adversary with access to all the private keys in the system, should not be able to tell if the encryption has been done to index i or i + 1. The game between the adversary and the challenger proceeds as follows. The game takes the index i as input which is given as input to both the challenger and the adversary.
-Setup: The challenger runs the SetupAugBE algorithm and sends the generated public key P K and the secret keys K1, K2 . . . Ki−1, Ki+1 . . . KN to the adversary. The adversary does not know Ki. -Query: The adversary outputs a bit s ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If s ′ = 1, the challenger sends the adversary Ki, else he does nothing.
-Challenge: The adversary sends a message M and a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , N } to the challenger. The only restriction is if s ′ = 1 then i / ∈ S. The challenger flips an unbiased coin and obtains a random β ∈ {0, 1}. It sets the ciphertext as C $ ← − EncryptAugBE(S, P K, i + β, M ) and sends it to the adversary.
-Guess: The adversary returns a guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1} of β.
The advantage of the adversary is AdvIH
• Message Hiding: This property requires that an adversary can not break semantic security when encryption is performed on input i = N + 1. The game between the adversary and the challenger is very similar to the Index Hiding game. The only difference being that now the adversary is given all the secret keys. The advantage of the adversary is the message hiding game is AdvMH . We refer the reader to [9] for details.
Definition 2.
1. An N-user AugBE system is considered secure if for all polynomial time adversaries AdvIH [i] for all i ∈ {1 . . . N } and AdvMH are negligible in the security parameter λ.
BACKGROUND ON BILINEAR MAPS
Bilinear Groups
Symmetric and Asymmetric Bilinear Groups of Prime Order. Consider three multiplicative cyclic groups G1, G2, GT of prime orders (possibly different). Let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 a generator of G2. Let r be the order of G1, the smaller of the two groups. We define an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT with the properties: (1) e is non-degenerate: e(g1, g2) should not evaluate to the identity element of GT . (2) The map is bilinear: ∀u ∈ G1, ∀v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zr we should have e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab . Such groups are refereed to as Asymmetric Bilinear Groups of Prime Order. Bilinear groups in which G1 = G2 ≡ G are called Symmetric Bilinear Groups of Prime Order. It can be seen that for such groups the bilinear map is symmetric since e(g a , g
Bilinear Groups of Composite Order. Bilinear groups of composite order are similar to the ones of prime order. The key difference is that the order of the groups G and GT is composite. Lets say the order is n, where n = pq, p and q are large primes depending on the security parameter. We will use Gp and Gq to denote the order p and q subgroups of G, respectively.
Complexity Assumptions
Let G be an algorithm that takes the security parameter λ as input and generates the tuple (r, G, GT , e).
Decision 3-party Diffie Hellman. This assumption is popular and has been used previously in a number of schemes including the PLBE scheme [8] . A challenger generates a bilinear group G using (r, G, GT , e) |. The Decision 3-party Diffie Hellman assumption states that this advantage is negligible in the security parameter.
Decisional Linear Assumption. This is a simple extension of the Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) Assumption introduced in [1] for bilinear groups in which the DDH assumption is actually easy. A challenger generates a bilinear group G using (r, G, GT , e) 
|. Decisional
Linear Assumption states that this advantage is negligible in the security parameter. External Diffie Hellman Assumption. The External Diffie Hellman (XDH) assumption states that the Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) assumption is hard in the group G1.
(Not necessarily hard in G2). This assumption is believed to be true in asymmetric pairings generated using special MNT curves [2, 20] .
Subgroup Decision Assumption. This problem was introduced by Boneh et al. [5] and states that for a bilinear group G of composite order n = pq, any algorithm A, given a random element g ∈ G and a random element gq ∈ Gq, can not distinguish between a random element in G and a random element in Gq. This assumption is for composite order groups. We do not use this assumption in this work.
KEY IDEAS
We now present the intuition behind the working of [8] for composite order bilinear groups and provide a generic construction to achieve the same properties using prime order bilinear groups. Consider a composite order bilinear group Gn of order n, where n = pq and p, q are primes. Let us denote elements belonging to the p-order subgroup (called Gp) and the q-order subgroup (called Gq) of Gn by subscripts p and q, respectively. The BSW scheme [8] (and most other composite order bilinear group based schemes) relies on the fact that if gp ∈ Gp and gq ∈ Gq, then e(gp, gq) = 1. The same effect can be obtained in a prime order group by using vector spaces. For a group G of prime order r, with generator g, consider tuples of elements (g a , g b ) (analogous to gq) and (g −b , g a ) (analogous to gp) belonging to the vector space V = G 2 (analogous to Gn), where a, b are random in Zr. Define vectors v1 = (a, b) and v2 = (−b, a). Note that they are orthogonal vectors. The subspace Vp (analogous to Gp) corresponds to the set of elements (g ap , g bp ) such that p ∈ Zr; and similarly subspace, Vq (analogous to Gq) corresponds to the set of elements (g −bq , g aq ) such thatq ∈ Zr. It is easy to see that pairing an element of Vp with an element of Vq computed 3 as e(g a , g −b ) · e(g b , g a ) yields the identity element (analogous to e(gp, gq) = 1). Now we need to build on an analog of the subgroup decision assumption (SDH). SDH informally states that given an element of G and an element of Gq, it is hard to distinguish a random element in Gq from a random element in G. But this assumption does not hold with Vp and Vq. Given an element (u, v) ∈ Vq, we can construct (v −1 , u) ∈ Vp. Using these two elements, it is trivial to distinguish an element in Vq from an element in V .
To fix this problem we consider a 3-dimensional vector space, V = G 3 . Consider v1 = (a, 0, c), v2 = (0, b, c) and v3 = v1 × v2, where a, b, c are random elements in Zr. Now let us define the subspace Vq by all elements (g aq , g bq ′ , g c(q+q ′ ) ) such thatq,q ′ ∈ Zr, and let the subspace Vp be defined by elements (g −bcp , g −acp , g abp ) such thatp ∈ Zr. For this system, also pairing an element of Vq with an element of Vp yields the identity element. This system also has an analog of the subgroup decision assumption. Given (g a , g b , g c ), we want it to be hard to distinguish a random element (g aq , g
∈ V , where x1, x2, x3 are random. This follows directly from the decisional linear assumption [1] .
The main difference between the subspaces defined using composite order bilinear groups and subspaces defined using prime order bilinear groups is the flexibility in the way elements from the sub-spaces can be manipulated. In the case of composite order bilinear groups, it is easy to randomize elements from the sub-space Vq; but on the other hand, for prime order groups similar randomization is hard. This prevents the transformation from being applicable in general.
A direct compilation of the BSW traitor tracing scheme with the new ideas presented earlier doesn't work because of the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph. But this can be fixed by allowing the encrypter to define the subspaces at the time of encryption. This was not possible in the BSW traitor tracing scheme [8] because the construction was dependent on the primes p, q. More generally, this trick allows, and in fact, necessitates a late binding of the parameters that define the subspaces. Other schemes satisfying this property should also be easy to simplify using our trick. Another crucial difference between our scheme and the BSW scheme is that our scheme does not have subspaces in the target group. Even some of the elements in the base group are not moved to the vector space.
OUR CONSTRUCTION
In this paper we present two new traitor tracing schemes and corresponding trace & revoke systems. As already pointed out in section 3 a PLBE scheme is sufficient to construct a traitor tracing system and an AugBE scheme is sufficient to construct a trace & revoke system. In this section we present our PLBE and AugBE improving on the previous schemes [8, 9] . The schemes in the symmetric and the asymmetric prime order bilinear groups are fundamentally different. It should be noted that all our schemes allow for public traceability. The PLBE schemes can be obtained by dropping certain terms from the AugBE scheme which we describe towards the end of the section.
The number of users in the system, N , is assumed to be equal to m 2 for some m. If the number of users is not a perfect square, then we add some dummy users to pad N to the next perfect square. These dummy users do not take part in the system in any way. We arrange the users in an m × m matrix. The user u : 1 ≤ u ≤ N in the system is identified by the (x, y) entry of the matrix, where 1 ≤ x, y ≤ m and u = (x − 1) · m + y.
The ciphertext generated by EncryptAugBE consists of a ciphertext component for every row and a component for every column. For each row x the ciphertext consists of (Ax, Bx, Rx, e Rx) and for every column y the ciphertext consists of ( Cy , e Cy ). Fully collusion resistant traitor tracing (or trace & revoke) is hard because we need to garble parts of the ciphertext making sure that it only impacts a certain subset of the users. This is made possible by having a ciphertext term have components along different subspaces. For the purposes of this paper, we use the notation V to represent the space of ciphertext elements. The elements in this space can have orthogonal components along Vq and Vp. The information about the sub-space Vq is public while the information for Vp is private. An encryption to position (i, j) means that only users (x, y) with x > i or x = i & y ≥ j can decrypt the message. • Column Ciphertext Components: Column ciphertext components for columns y ≥ j are well formed in both subspaces Vp and Vq, while for columns y < j are well formed in Vq but are random in Vp.
• Row Ciphertext Components: Row ciphertext components for rows x < i are completely random, and these recipients can not obtain the message information theoretically. For row x = i, the row ciphertext is well formed in both Vp and Vq. And for rows x > i they are well formed in Vq and have no component in Vp.
A user in row i will be able to decrypt if the column ciphertext is also well formed in both Vp and Vq. However a user in rows x > i, will always be able to decrypt because the row ciphertexts for x > i do not have any component in Vp, and the component of column ciphertexts in Vp will simply cancel out with the row ciphertexts.
In the AugBE scheme in addition to the above properties there is a set S that specifies the set of users to which encryption is done. In other words only users in that set can decrypt.
AugBE using Symmetric Bilinear Groups
We introduce some notation before we go further and describe the scheme. For a given vector v = (v1, . . . vi), by g v we mean the vector (g v 1 . . . g v i ). A pairing e on two vectors R and C is defined by multiplication after the componentwise pairing operation, i.e. e( R, C)
where e is the pairing operation on the underlying group elements. Given a set S of users to which encryption is to be done let Sx = {y : (x, y) ∈ S}. The AugBE scheme consists of the algorithms: SetupAugBE, EncryptAugBE, DecryptAugBE.
The SetupAugBE algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the number of users N in the system. The algorithm generates a prime order groups G with a pairing e : G × G → G T . It outputs, g the generator of G and let r (depends on the security parameter) denote the size of G. It then chooses random r1, r2, r3, . . . rm, c1, c2 . . . cm, α1, α2 . . . αm ∈ Zr. The public key P K of the AugBE system (along with the group description) is set to:
The secret key of each user (x, y) is
σx,y y }.
•
This algorithm allows the tracing party to encrypt a message to the recipients who have row value greater than i or those who have row value equal to i and column value greater than or equal to j and belonging to the set S. The algorithm chooses random t, η, s1, s2 . . . sm ∈ Zr. It also chooses random a, b, c ∈ Zr and sets v1 = (a, 0, c), v2 = (0, b, c) and v3 = v1 × v2. All elements g v when v is a linear combination of v1 and v2 define the Vq space. These elements define the space Vp when the vector v is parallel to v3. Choose w1, w2, . . . , wm , vc ∈ Z For each row, 1 ≤ x < i, choose random zx ∈ Z 3 r and ax, bx ∈ Zr . The row cipher text components are,
This prevents parties (i, y), with y < j from decrypting the message.
The row cipher text component for x = i is,
This allows all parties (x, y) to decrypt the message, if x > i.
The row cipher text components for all x > i are,
And for every column y < j, the column ciphertext components are,
η wy e Cy = g wy And for every column y ≥ j, the column ciphertext components are,
be the key used by recipient (x, y). Note that user (x, y) can always compute the product when y ∈ Sx and cannot compute this product otherwise.
e( e Rx, e Cy )
The broadcast encryption procedure is to obtained by encrypting using EncryptAugBE(P K, 0, M ). This illustrates the public traceability of our system.The correctness of decryption follows by inspection.
AugBE using Asymmetric Bilinear Groups
The AugBE scheme consists of the algorithms: SetupAugBE, EncryptAugBE, DecryptAugBE.
The SetupAugBE algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the number of users N in the system. The algorithm generates two prime order groups G1, G2 with a pairing e : G1 × G2 → G T . It outputs, g1 and g2, generators of G1 and G2 and let r (depends on the security parameter) denote the size of G1. It then chooses random r1, r2, r3, . . . rm, c1, c2 . . . cm, α1, α2 . . . αm ∈ Zr. The public key P K of the AugBE system (along with the group description) is set to:
, . . . , Hm = g cm 2 u1, u2, . . . , um ∈ G2.
The secret key of each user (x, y) is K (x,y) = {g • C ← EncryptAugBE(P K, S, (i, j), M )
The algorithm chooses random t, η, s1, s2 . . . sm ∈ Zr and w1, w2, . . . , wm , v1, vc ∈ Z 
All elements g
v when v is a along v1 define the Vq space. These elements belong to the space Vp when the vector v is parallel to v2. Based on the XDH assumption the details about the Vp space are private.
For each row, 1 ≤ x < i, pick random zx ∈ Z 2 r and ax, bx ∈ Zr . The row cipher text components are,
This allows all parties (x, y), for all values of y to decrypt the message, if x > i.
e Cy = g wy 2
And for every column y ≥ j, the column ciphertext components are,
The normal encryption procedure is to just encrypt to EncryptAugBE(P K, 0, M ). This illustrates the public traceability of our system. The correctness of decryption follows by inspection.
PLBE
The two AugBE schemes based on symmetric and asymmetric prime order groups respectively can be converted to the corresponding PLBE schemes by removing the u terms from the public key. We will also need to get rid of the u and σ terms in the secret key. Row ciphertexts will not include Tx terms and decryption will not require a pairing corresponding to the term Tx. Rest of the parts of the scheme remain the same. Details can be found in the full version of the paper.
SECURITY PROOF
Here we only give the proof for the AugBE scheme using symmetric prime order bilinear groups. The proof for the AugBE scheme based on asymmetric prime order bilinear groups is also similar. The only difference is that security depends on the XDH assumption. The security of the PLBE schemes is implied by the security of the AugBE schemes.
Index Hiding
Theorem 6.1. If the Decision 3-party Diffie Hellman assumption and the decisional linear assumption hold, then no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can distinguish between an encryption to two adjacent recipients in the index hiding game for any (i, j) where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m with nonnegligible probability.
Proof. We consider two possible cases. First, when the adversary tries to distinguish between ciphertexts encrypted to (i, j) and (i, j +1) when 1 ≤ j < m. Second, when the adversary tries to distinguish between ciphertexts encrypted to (i, m) and (i+1, 1) when 1 ≤ i < m. The first case follows by Lemma 6.2 and the second case follows by Lemma 6.3.
Lemma 6.2. If the Decision 3-party Diffie Hellman assumption holds, then no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can distinguish between an encryption to recipient (i, j) and (i, j + 1) in the index hiding game for any (i, j) where j < m with non-negligible probability.
Proof. This proof is similar to proof of Lemma 5.2 of [8] , though the public parameter settings are different. Details can be found in the full version of the paper. Lemma 6.3. If the Decision 3-party Diffie Hellman assumption and the decisional linear assumption hold, then no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can distinguish between an encryption to recipient (i, m) and (i + 1, 1) in the index hiding game for any 1 ≤ i < m with non-negligible probability.
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows from a series of claims that establish the indistinguishability of the following games.
• H1 Encrypt to column 4 m, row i is the target row, 5 row i + 1 is the greater-than row. Columns greater than or equal to m are well formed, both in Vp and Vq. 5 The row for which the row component of the ciphertext has well formed components, both in Vp and Vq. 6 The first row with the row component of ciphertexts only in Vq.
• H2 Encrypt to column m + 1, row i is the target row, row i + 1 is the greater-than row.
• H3 Encrypt to column m + 1, row i is the less-than row, row i + 1 is the greater-than row (no target row).
• H4 Encrypt to column 1, row i is the less-than row, row i + 1 is the greater-than row (no target row).
• H5 Encrypt to column 1, row i is the less-than row, row i + 1 is the target row.
It can be observed that game H1 corresponds to the encryption being done to (i, m) and game H5 corresponds to encryption to (i+1, 1). We refer the reader to the full version for details on the indistinguishability of the games.
Message Hiding
Theorem 6.4. No adversary can distinguish between two ciphertexts when the encryption is done to the (m + 1, 1).
Proof. This means that all rows will be completely random and independent of the message. Hence, information theoretically the adversary has no way of identifying which message has been encrypted.
IMPLEMENTATION
We provide the first implementation of fully collusion resistant traitor tracing and trace & revoke schemes. We use only prime order bilinear groups in this implementation. We implement all of our schemes using the Pairing Based Crypto (PBC) library [18] . For schemes that use asymmetric bilinear groups, we generate them using MNT curves [20] . The group size is 170 bits long, the group representations are 512 bits long, and the security is equivalent to 1024 bits of discrete log. It is also believed that the XDH assumption holds on these curves (Section 8.1 [6] ). For symmetric bilinear groups, we use super singular curves (with fastest pairing times but bad group element size). We use 512 bit group representations and have 1024 bits of discrete log security. One can choose other alternative symmetric groups that have smaller group size with faster exponentiation but slower pairing operations. This kind of tradeoff was not possible in previous systems [8, 9] .
We contrast our schemes' efficiency with an implementation of [8] . [8] only provides traitor tracing functionality. We compare our traitor tracing scheme with [8] in Tables 1,2 and Figure 4 . We also provide additional data on our trace & revoke implementation (Table 3) ). Currently, the only known way to generate composite order groups is by using symmetric bilinear groups. Also, their subgroup decision assumption mandates that the order of the composite group be at least 1024 bits (to avoid sub-exponential factoring based attacks). We compare the encryption time, decryption time and ciphertext sizes as the number of users grow for all these schemes.
A real implementation of broadcast encryption will use a symmetric key cipher under some key K [8] . But this key K still needs to be distributed and one can use our schemes for key distribution. By converting our encryption system to a Key Encapsulation Mechanism we can save on computation. Under this optimization, we do not need to evaluate Bx or include it in the ciphertext. A user (x, y) can extract the 
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. The ciphertext would now have to contain an encryption of K under each of the Kx. The user can then derive K from an encryption of it under Kx. In Table 1 and 2 we provide a comparison of our PLBE scheme for the case of symmetric and asymmetric prime order groups with that of [8] (which uses composite order groups). The implementation was done on an Intel i3 2.9GHz quad core desktop PC with 2GB RAM. The groups were chosen to guarantee 1024 bits of discrete log security for encryption time and ciphertext size.
Encryption Time
The encryption time (Table 1, Figure 2 ) is heavily dependent on a large number of exponentiation operations, one for each row of ciphertext. It depends on the number of users as O( √ N ), explaining the parabolic nature of the graph(s). The cost of exponentiation operations in elliptic curves depend both on group representation size and the actual order of the group. The order of symmetric groups that we have chosen for this implementation are constructed to be of the form 2 a ±2 b ±1, for some integers a, b. This makes exponentiation in them very efficient. The asymmetric order groups are efficient because of their smaller group size. The com- 
Ciphertext Size
The ciphertext size (Table 2, Figure 3) is dependent on the representation size of the elliptic curve and the number of group elements used. Our construction, although using a larger number of group elements, has smaller total ciphertext size (in the asymmetric case) because the group sizes are significantly smaller. The asymmetric groups, by their nature allows us to optimize ciphertext size by increasing the number of rows and decreasing the columns in (Fig. 1) . We call this the Skewed Asymmetric group version. Note that by design, most of the group elements in the ciphertext are placed in the smaller group G1. Skewing has no effect on security proofs and allows us to optimize on ciphertext size.
Calculations show that using 25 × 16(= 400) rectangle for generating ciphertexts produces only 15680 bytes which gives us a 50% improvement compared to the scheme of [8] We provide and implement efficient broadcast, trace & revoke system. Table 3 provides encryption times and ci- phertext size (in bytes) for up to 5625 users. The security guaranteed on the elliptic curves used are 1024 bit discrete log security. 
Decryption Time
The decryption time for the various scenarios ( Figure 4 ) above are relatively constant and independent of the number of users for each scheme. This is because decryption time is dominated by the cost of pairing operations on the elliptic curves. The composite order schemes decrypt at 0.296s per ciphertext and the primer order symmetric and asymmetric groups decrypt at 0.051s and 0.032s respectively. Thus we see the prime order groups are relative similar w.r.t decryption times and are 10 times faster due to faster pairing operations in these groups.
Comparison with the ElGamal Encryption
We compare the efficiency of our scheme with an implementation of a naïve (but optimized) ElGamal based traitor tracing scheme. The advantage of using an ElGamal based scheme is that the group that it works on could support very efficient arithmentic operations (we choose the multiplicative group Z * p for a 1024 bit prime p) making encryption very fast. The disadvantage is that for N users ElGamal based systems use O(N ) steps whereas our scheme uses O( √ N ) steps. We observe that the ElGamal implementation has a huge ciphertext size overload compared to our scheme (Figure 5) . We also observe that asymptotic improvements in the encryption time begin to show up for as few as 2500 users ( Figure 6 ). 
CONCLUSION
Boneh et al. [8, 9] provide traitor tracing and trace & revoke systems using composite order bilinear groups. These groups have large exponentiation and pairing times making them impractical. We provide the first implementation of a traitor tracing and trace & revoke systems, using symmetric and asymmetric prime order bilinear groups. Our implementation and comparisons with [8] show that we achieve about 10 times faster decryption, 6 times faster encryption and 50% reduction in ciphertext size. The ideas presented in this work are general and can be applied to convert other composite order cryptosystems to efficient prime order based cryptosystems.
